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Abstract
While most organizations continue to invest in traditional network defences, a formidable security challenge has
been brewing within their own boundaries. Malicious insiders with privileged access in the guise of a trusted source
have carried out many attacks causing far reaching damage to financial stability, national security and brand reputation
for both public and private sector organizations. Growing exposure and impact of the whistleblower community
and concerns about job security with changing organizational dynamics has further aggravated this situation. The
unpredictability of malicious attackers, as well as the complexity of malicious actions, necessitates the careful analysis
of network, system and user parameters correlated with insider threat problem. Thus it creates a high dimensional,
heterogeneous data analysis problem in isolating suspicious users. This research work proposes an insider threat
detection framework, which utilizes the attributed graph clustering techniques and outlier ranking mechanism for
enterprise users. Empirical results also confirm the effectiveness of the method by achieving the best area under curve
value of 0.7648 for the receiver operating characteristic curve.
I. Introduction
Insider threat mitigation or finding the enemy hiding within the boundaries of an enterprise network is one of the
most critical and complex cybersecurity threats. By looking at the publicly available threat cases [6] and published
literature [13] [27] on insider threat, it is evident that the insider threat can no longer be treated as a data driven
problem. It needs to be considered as a combination of data and human behavior driven problem. This drives
the requirement for going beyond technical capabilities to understand the unpredictable behavior of the trusted
insider. Though there is no particular demographic profile for malicious insiders, there are common characteristics
among the three broad categories of insider threat, namely IT sabotage, theft of intellectual property and IT fraud.
These characteristics are based on the type of people involved, the motivation for the attack, the time span and
the level of damage caused by the attack. In addition several researchers, e.g., Berk et al [3] and Massberg et al
[20], highlighted the correlation between Capability (Means), Motivation, and Opportunity (CMO/MMO Model)
for triggering a malicious insider activity. In addition to disgruntle workplace behavior, users tend to publicize
their inside (in-office) experiences online. This includes their interests which have been influenced by positive and
negative organizational dynamics. Therefore the insider threat mitigation framework needs to be expanded so that it
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2Fig. 1. The Proposed Framework for Insider Threat Detection.
can capture users’ online presence as well. Several other researchers identified various psychological factors which
have direct implications on insider threat problem [4] [8] [15].
Based on the above facts it is evident that insider threat mitigation frameworks need to consider heterogeneous
data generated from different information sources. Therefore the analysis of such data needs to be considered as
a high-dimensional heterogeneous data problem. Among the various methods proposed in the literature for insider
threat detection problem we choose to continue our research on graph based approaches as in our previous work
[10] [11]. Given the complexity of insider threat problem, a direct application of anomaly detection techniques
on plain (i.e., unattributed) graphs would not be sufficient. The “plain” graph based anomaly detection techniques
only consider the topological structure while neglecting the associated vertex/edge attribute values. In order to
capture topological structure as well as attribute information, we decided to implement anomaly detection techniques
associated with attributed graphs. Given the two main anomaly detection approaches on attributed graphs namely,
structure based and community based methods [1] we focus on the later approach which aims to identify community
outliers. Community outliers find vertices with significantly deviating attribute values within a community. This
type of anomaly detection approach would be beneficial in the special case of insider threat problem as some of
the behavioural changes can easily be identified when compared with peer level behavioral patterns.
Our Contribution:In this work we propose the use of attributed graph anomaly detection techniques for malicious
activity detection which has not not been explored in depth in the insider threat domain. In addition, we propose
several outlier ranking scores which can be used as an indication of possible risk from each individual in an enterprise
network. This scoring scheme is based on both topological structure and high dimensional attribute values generated
from heterogeneous data sources. The basic framework proposed in this work is depicted in Figure 1.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related work on graph based insider
threat detection and anomaly detection in attributed graphs. Section 3 describes the adopted methodology. The
3experimental results and evaluation of results are discussed in section 4 and 5 respectively. Section 6 concludes the
paper indicating conclusions and future directions.
II. Related Work
Initial insider threat research efforts were influenced by the techniques used to detect external attacks. Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) approaches, system-call-based approaches, data-centric approaches, honeypot approaches,
machine learning techniques and visualization methods are the main approaches [27] popular among different
research groups who are actively engaged in insider threat problem. But many of the above methods led to a high
number of false positives and faced several other challenges such as difficulties in handling large datasets, the
inability of detecting real-time insider threats, and inaccuracy of the user profiles. Emphasizing the significance of
bringing together many aspects of insider threat (including technical and behavioural events/indicators as well as as
human factors such as precipitating event, personality characteristics, historical behavior, motivation to attack and
the capability to attack [5] [24]), insider threat research community focused their attention on high dimensional,
heterogeneous data analysis techniques. To overcome the difficulties in analyzing high dimensional, heterogeneous
data, some of the insider threat related researchers focused on machine learning approaches and the graph based
approaches. Multidimensional data representation capabilities, improved visualization capabilities and feasibility of
unsupervised anomaly detection capabilities are the main drivers for us to continue our insider threat detection
research on graph based approaches.
Based on the fact that this research work is focused on anomaly detection in attributed graphs on insider threat
domain, only the literature related to graph based insider threat detection models, anomaly detection in attributed
graphs and outlier ranking in attributed graphs are discussed in the following subsections.
II-A. Graph Based Insider Threat Detection Approaches
The framework proposed by Chen and Malin [7] is a graph based approach for insider threat detection in
collaborative information systems (CIS). Their model comprises of a relational pattern extraction component and
an anomaly detection unit. CIS access logs are mined for communities of users using bipartite graph mapping
and dimensionality reduction models. The community based anomaly detection system (CADS) of the proposed
framework discovers the nearest neighbors of each user and calculate the deviation of each user to their nearest
neighbors. Even though they have identified the requirement of community detection for identifying possible
anomalous users, graph mapping is not expanded upto the attributed graphs.
The framework suggested by Eberle and Holder [9] is another graph-based approach for malicious insider
threat detection. Anomalies are detected using graph substructures which are not isomorphic to graph’s normative
substructure, by using the minimum description length principle for detecting anomalous activities. They have
focused on three broad types of graph anomalies identified in their work namely, insertions, modifications and
deletions. Consideration of many attributes from insider threat related inputs is missing in this approach and the
usage of multiple algorithms for different anomalies might lead to a complex threat detection framework.
4Proactive insider threat detection framework proposed by Brdiczka et al [5] utilizes graph learning and psycho-
logical modeling of users. This model is a combination of structural anomaly detection and psychological profiling
model which explore the possibility of including dynamical properties of nodal attributes. Althebyan and Panda [2]
have also suggested the use of graph theory to formulate two components, knowledge graph and object dependency
graphs. A knowledge graph represents knowledge units for a given insider and they are updated over the time. A
dependency graph is a global hierarchical graph that shows all dependencies among various objects. Even though
this model tries to include accumulated knowledge of the insider over time on systems and objects it can be
improved by including several other parameters such as user’s behavioral patterns and psychological aspects.
Another study performed by Nance and Marty [23] introduced the use of bipartite graphs for identifying and
visualizing insider threat. They tried to establish acceptable insider behavior patterns based on workgroup role
classifications. High false positive rates is one of the weaknesses of this method even though it is capable of
detecting certain insider threats. Kent et al [18] proposed the use of authentication subgraphs for analyzing users
behavior within an enterprise network utilizing a set of subgraph attributes in user profiling. Time series analysis
of subgraphs and use of bipartite graphs are also introduced in their work, which is focused on a much more
comprehensive analysis in their ongoing work.
Contributions by above described research work clearly indicate the feasibility of usage of graph based approaches
for representation of insider threat related data. Also, it is clear researchers were focused on various anomaly
detection techniques for identifying possible malicious users. But many of those proposed methods do not expand
to capture the heterogeneity and high dimensionality associated with the insider threat problem. Finally, the above
proposed graph based anomaly detection techniques do not consider both graph topology and graph attributes
simultaneously.
II-B. Graph Clustering in Attributed Graphs
Attributed graphs provide a way of obtaining richer graph representation, in which nodes and edges exhibit their
properties through both graph topology and graph attributes. These types of graphs can be applicable in many
applications such as social networks, transaction networks, technological networks, biological networks, and so on
in which most of the related information is stored as attributes of corresponding vertices and edges. Considering the
diversity of associated input information with insider threat problem, we believe attributed graphs can be regarded
as a appropriate means for data representation.
Anomaly detection in attributed graphs can be categorised into structure based methods and community based
methods [1]. The basic idea behind structure based techniques is to identify uncommon substructures based on
the graph connectivity as well as attributes. Community based anomaly detection techniques focus on the nodes in
which attribute values are significantly deviate from the other members of the community that they belong to. Based
on the reasoning behind above anomaly detection techniques, we believe community based anomaly detection in
attributed graphs is more suitable for the insider threat detection frameworks as it would be a better approach for
analysing individual behaviour with respect to peers.
5Attributed graph clustering has received much more attention in the recent past with the identification of the
requirement of analysing high dimensional, heterogeneous data. The method proposed by Zhou et al [28] generates
new vertices (“attribute vertices”) for each attribute and new edges (“attribute edges”) between the vertex and the
attribute vertex, if the corresponding vertex has the selected attribute value. Then they use a unified neighborhood
random walk model on the attributed-augmented graph to find clusters.
In contrast to the above method Moser et al [21], Gu¨nnemann et al [16] [17] proposed attributed graph clustering
as a twofold clustering technique which is simultaneously represent attribute subsapces and dense subgraphs. A
subspace cluster is a set of objects with an appropriate dimension, in which object attributes are very similar to
each other. Dense subgraphs are set of nodes which are densely connected with each other based on “quasi-clique”
property [19]. Among the above mentioned attributed graph clustering algorithms, we believe subspace and subgraph
clustering techniques are more suitable in the insider threat context, in comparison to attribute augmented graph
clustering.
II-C. Outlier Ranking Methods
The algorithms mentioned in the above subsections are mainly focused on graph clustering on attributed graphs.
But the scope of these algorithms do not cover the anomaly detection and outlier ranking simultaneously. The
methods proposed by Gao et al [12] simultaneously finds communities as well as identifying community outliers
using an unsupervised learning algorithm called “CODA”. But the usage of global attribute space for community
detection would create limitations on direct application on insider threat problem. Another recent clustering mech-
anism is “FOCUSCO”, proposed by Perozzi et al [25], which couples both attributed graph clustering and outlier
detection and utilizes user-oriented attribute selection technique which is fairly different from other approaches.
“GOutRank” is the first approach for outlier ranking in subspaces of attributed clustering [22]. They have used the
existing techniques for the selection of subgraphs and subspaces. The proposed outlier ranking mechanism utilize
three indicators which includes subspace dimension, cluster dimension and the graph structure. Normalized degree
of a node and the normalized eigenvector centrality have been used as graph structure indicators in outlier ranking.
In our opinion, outlier ranking in the context of insider threat problem can be coupled with outlier ranking with
subspace/subgraph clustering in attributed graphs. Thus we focus our analysis based on “GOuRank” outlier ranking
mechanism with “EDCAR” and “GAMER” algorithms which outstanding in subspace and subgraph clustering in
attributed graphs.
III. Methodology
This section mainly discusses the adopted methodology in ranking individual users under the proposed insider
threat mitigation framework. Due to the lack of availability of proper insider threat datasets we have utilized the
insider threat dataset published by CERT at Carnegie Mellon University for this research [26]. Out of the different
versions of available datasets, the set “R4.2.tar.bz” has been used for this analysis. This dataset consists of users’
LDAP records and six other broad types of data records (HTTP, logon, device, file, email and psychometric) of
61000 employees of 42 different work roles spanning over a 17 months period.
As the first step of our approach, the relationships among enterprise users are mapped into an undirected,
unweighted graph G(V,E,A) where V is the set of vertices (users), E is the set of edges, and A is the set of
attributes. Construction of the graph, based on user relationships is carried out as follows;
1) Users are represented as vertices
2) Edges between vertices are built based on
• organizational hierarchy (represent supervisor - subordinate relationship)
• email communications (if there is an email communication between two users)
When generating the graph structure, the employees “supervisor - subordinate” relationship is first mapped in to
an undirected edge between corresponding users. In addition, we have used email communication logs to capture
users friendship network within the enterprise network. This relationship is captured by analyzing all emails address
“TO”, “CC” or “BCC” within the enterprise domain. Then, an edge between the sender and the recipient is created.
Within the scope of this research, we exclude the directionality and the weights of edges as subspace and subgraph
clustering algorithms have not been developed to apply on directed graphs. Also we have excluded relationships
with external users in the generated graph, but we have captured the relationship with external users as a separate
attribute.
In addition each vertex v (in this work this is a “user”) is described by a vector (a1, . . . , ad) ∈ <d in a
d− dimensional continuous data space where the attributes are denoted A = (A1, . . . , Ad).
III-A. Attribute Extraction
In this work statistical techniques are used for extracting related attributes from various information streams such
as logon/logoff records, web access records, email communications, removable media usage records and file copy
activities. This mainly includes extraction of maximum, minimum and average value of the selected parameters.
The list of parameters used in this analysis as well as number of calculated sub-parameters are summarized in Table
1. All categorical attributes of users (role, functional unit, department and team) are mapped into integers and time
values are converted to decimal format before feeding into the attributed graph clustering algorithms. Parameter
values which correspond to file type are calculated as the ratio between the number of files copied by a user in the
selected file type and the total number of files copied by the same user.
III-B. Subgraph and Subspace Extraction
In this work we propose the use of community based anomaly detection techniques in attributed graphs. Our
aim is to identify the outlier nodes with attribute values which deviate significantly from the rest of the nodes of
the selected community [1]. In high dimensional attributed graphs consideration of all set of attributes would not
be able to clearly identify the exceptional outliers. Also outliers would not be visible if we consider the irrelevant
attributes [22]. This argument is much more applicable in the insider threat problem as, finding the hidden truth
really depends on the analysis of enormous amount of heterogeneous data. Also detection of several insider threat
7TABLE I
PARAMETER LIST
Index Attribute Name No.of sub
attributes
1 Number of recipients in TO/CC/BCC fields 9
2 Email size 3
3 Number of attachments 3
4 Daily number of sent emails (all/Business Hours (BH)/After Hours (AH) 9
5 Email sent time 3
6 Number of devices used for email activities 1
7 Number of email address 1
8 Number of internal users connected through emails 1
9 Number of external users connected through emails 1
10 Role 1
11 Functional unit 1
12 Department 1
13 Team 1
14 Logon Time (all/BH/AH) 9
15 Logoff Time (all/BH/AH) 9
16 Daily number of logons (all/BH/AH) 9
17 Daily number of logoffs (all/BH/AH) 9
18 Daily number of devices used for logon/logoff activities 3
19 Number of daily usage - removable media (all/BH/AH) 9
20 Removable media usage time (BH/AH) 9
21 Number of devices used for removable media 4
22 Total number of days - removable media 1
23 File copy time (all/BH/AH) 9
24 Number of days - file copy (all/BH/AH) 3
25 Number of files - file copy (all/BH/AH) 9
26 File type 6
27 Number of devices used for file copy 1
cases need to be analyzed as threat scenarios which involves only a few of the selected attributes or a subset of
the global attribute space.
As proposed in [22] the first step of outlier ranking in high dimensional, heterogeneous data requires detection
of an graph context of an outlier (subgraphs) and relevant attribute set (subspace) in which an outlier is deviating.
As mentioned in Section 2 we decided to adopt the subspace clustering algorithms “EDCAR” [17] and “GAMER”
[16] for subspace clustering. Due to the fact that subspace and subgraph clustering is an emerging field in graph
clustering techniques, we have decided to used the above two algorithms which outperform on other clustering
techniques on attributed graphs.
Subspace clustering result of an attributed graph is a set of subspace clusters Res = {(C1, S1) . . . (Cn, Sn)},
8where Ci ⊂ V is a densely connected subgraph with high attribute similarity in the subspace Si ⊂ A [22].
III-C. Outlier Ranking
The next step involves ranking of all vertices of the graph G based on the identified subgraphs and subspaces. In
the context of insider threat this scoring function can be considered as a user profile scoring system which can be
utilized by a security analyst for further investigations. The first outlier ranking approach (GOutRank) in subspaces
of attributed graphs was proposed by [22]. We first calculate the outlier ranking scores based on two proposed
scoring mechanisms based on node degree scoring and eigenvalue scoring as mentioned in equations (1) and (2).
score1(v)=
1
3
·
∑
{(C,S)∈Res|v∈C}
|C|
cmax
+
|S|
smax
+
|deg(v)|
degmax
(1)
score2(v)=
1
3
·
∑
{(C,S)∈Res|v∈C}
|C|
cmax
+
|S|
smax
+
|EC(v)|
ECmax
(2)
In addition to above two scoring mechanisms we propose the use of betweenness centrality measure which is a
measure of centrality in graphs based on shortest paths. The corresponding score is calculated as in equation (3).
score3(v)=
1
3
·
∑
{(C,S)∈Res|v∈C}
|C|
cmax
+
|S|
smax
+
|BC(v)|
BCmax
(3)
Also we calculate score4(v), score5(v) and score6(v), which are combinations of above mentioned 3 graph
properties (degree, eigenvector centrality and betweeneess centrality) as in equations (4), (5) and (6).
score4(v)=
1
4
·
∑
{(C,S)∈Res|v∈C}
A+
|EC(v)|
ECmax
(4)
score5(v)=
1
4
·
∑
{(C,S)∈Res|v∈C}
A+
|BC(v)|
BCmax
(5)
score6(v)=
1
5
·
∑
{(C,S)∈Res|v∈C}
A+
|EC(v)|
ECmax
+
|BC(v)|
BCmax
(6)
where
A =
|C|
cmax
+
|S|
smax
+
|deg(v)|
degmax
In all the above equations |C| is the number of objects in cluster C and |S| is the number of attributes
in the subspace. Cmax and Smax are the maximal cluster size and the maximal dimensionality in Res. Also
deg(v)/degmax, EC(v)/ECmax and BC(v)/BCmax represent normalized edge degree, eigenvector centrality and
betwenness centrality respectively.
Vertices not clustered or clustered as part of very small, sparsely connected communities with low dimensional
subspaces are considered as clear outliers. Therefore the vertices with lower score values can be considered as
outliers while vertices with higher score values can be treated as normal.
9(a) Organizational Hierarchy and Email Communication (b) Organizational Hierarchy
Fig. 2. User Relationship Graphs
IV. Experimental Results
The figure 2(a) corresponds to the user relationship graph which is generated using both organizational hierarchy
and email communications within the enterprise network. For comparison purposes, we have illustrated the user
relationship graph generated considering only the organizational structure. Less dense graph 2(b) indicates that we
can not extract much structural information about user relationships just considering the organizational structure.
Therefore we believe that the graph generated with both organizational hierarchy and email communications would
be a good choice for identifying inter user relationships. The graph 2(a) consists of 1000 vertices and 116, 097
undirected and unweighted edges. Each vertex is defined as a vector of 125 attributes, which were extracted from
different information sources summarized in Table 1.
The experiments were carried out with “EDCAR” [17] and “GAMER” [16] algorithms for different values of nmin
(minimum number of members in a cluster) and smin (minimum subspace dimension) keeping other parameters
fixed (γmin = 0.5, a = b = c = 1, robj = 0.1 and rdim = 0.1). We could not get any results for the tested parameter
values with “GAMER” algorithm within 3 days of processing. Therefore the table 2 summarizes the number of
clusters and number of users clustered together using “EDCAR” algorithms with different nmin and smin values.
Based on the number of clusters and the total number of users grouped together in each case, we achieved better
clustering for lower values of nmin for constant smin values. Based on this result we can see 3 is a good candidate
for nmin in this context. The total number of users belonging to clusters as well as number of clusters reduces
with the increase of the minimum number of members in a cluster (nmin). This resulted in a higher number of
users not belonging to any of the clusters. If the number of users who can be clustered with at least a few of the
other employees is higher, this is an indication that they have at least several behavioral similarities. Users who
10
TABLE II
CLUSTERING SUMMARY OF EDCAR ALGORITHM
nmin
No.of Clusters No.of Clustered Users
smin smin
3 4 5 3 4 5
2 237 118 66 745 493 342
3 248 114 83 763 474 429
4 240 121 55 734 501 282
5 234 111 81 719 480 417
6 250 120 67 768 505 339
7 251 109 84 766 461 426
8 248 113 90 761 476 461
9 241 104 89 732 434 456
10 238 115 66 744 459 336
TABLE III
CLUSTERING SUMMARY OF TOPOLOGICAL GRAPH CLUSTERING ALGORITHMS
Clustering Algorithm No. of Clusters Cluster Membership Size
Edge Betweeness 226 1× 225, 775
Walktrap 12 31× 11, 659
Multilevel 11 20,23,37,39,76,107,108,135,150
Fastgreedy 3 260,298,442
Leading Eigenvector 3 245,273,482
Informap 1 1000
Label propagation 1 1000
can not be clustered based on both structural and attribute properties can be regarded as high risk employees, as
their behavior is somewhat different from others.
To compare the effectiveness of the attributed graph clustering, we have performed graph clustering on the same
graph with several other “plain” graph clustering techniques. (All these algorithms are available in R in the “igraph”
package). These graph clustering methods mainly looked at the graph structure and did not consider the associated
vertex attributes. The number of clusters obtained in selected topological graph community detection techniques
is summarized in Table 3. As in the resulted number of clusters in the structural community detection methods
we can clearly see many of these algorithms do not suit our problem due to the relatively smaller number of
clusters resulting in a large number of unclustered users or clusters with a large number of memberships. Though
the number of clusters obtained from the edge betweenness community detection algorithm [14] is relatively close
to the number of clusters obtained with attributed graph clustering, many of the clusters (225) comprise of only
a single vertex, which can be regarded as not clustered at all and all the other users were clustered in a single
community. Therefore it is evident that the application of attributed graph clustering is much more meaningful than
11
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Fig. 3. Variation of Outlier Scores for Different Scoring Functions
the traditional structural community detection techniques in the context of insider threat problem. Also from the two
different attributed graph clustering methods “EDCAR” and “GAMER”, we observe better results for “EDCAR”
as “GAMER” was not able to produce results within at least 3 days of run time.
IV-A. Outlier Ranking
Outlier ranking scores corresponding to different scoring functions (defined in equations (1) to (6)) are calculated
and illustrated in figure 3, in the descending order of scores. (best 3 graphs corresponding to three different nmin
values are illustrated, as score distributions corresponding to other cases with same nmin values also have similar
shape of graphs with different values of scores). The distribution of outlier scores in CASE O, indicates that the
majority of users have fairly common ranking scores while a minority of users with either relatively higher scores
or lower scores. But based on the subspace and subgraph clustering algorithm, the users with higher scores can be
treated as normal as they correspond to densely connected subgraphs for a set of attribute. Therefore the users with
the lower scores can be regarded as possibly suspicious actors, who are deviating from the majority of users. The
rest of the outlier score graphs indicate that the percentage of users with lower scores increases with the increase
of nmin. Therefore we believe that we achieve better performance by keeping nmin or the minimum number of
members in a cluster to relatively a small number. This argument can be easily correlated with the real world
environments as a few employees will behave similarly when we consider set of associated parameters.
V. Evaluation of Results
One of the major challenges faced by the insider threat research community is difficulties and limitations of cross-
validation of proposed methods. This is mainly due to the use of different datasets (in most cases private datasets),
12
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Fig. 4. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves; the above graphs illustrate the ROC curves for different scoring functions with EDCAR
clustering algorithm. The x-axes denote false positive rate (FPR) and the y-axes denote true positive rate (TPR).
the focus on a specific problem, or application to a particular scenario when presenting individuals’ insider threat
models. Thus we have used the ground truth from the dataset for evaluation of the results. The area under curve
(AUC) value of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves is used as the indicator for the assessment.
Figure 4 illustrates the corresponding ROC curves for each test scenario. Corresponding AUC values for different
scoring functions based on “EDCAR” attributed graph clustering technique are summarized in Table 4 (all test cases
for smin <= 5 and only the test cases for smin > 5 with nmin = 3 are shown). From the different nmin values
the best performance is observed for nmin = 3. With the value of nmin = 3 the best performance is achieved with
smin of 8. We achieved the best AUC value (0.7648) of ROC curve for the scoring function defined using node
degree measure as in equation (1) with the minimum cluster size of 3 and the minimum attribute dimension of
8. The scoring functions defined with individual graph properties (equations (1) to (3)) performed better than the
scoring functions defined as a combination of graph properties (equations (4) to (6)). But with this empirical results
we could not highlight any of the scoring functions defined in (equations (1) to (3)) as the best performer. But
based on the empirical results we believe the proposed framework works fairly well for the insider threat problem.
Also we shall continue our research on identifying several other graph structural features that can be used in final
scoring functions.
VI. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have introduced the use of attributed graphs for representing high dimensional, heterogeneous
data in the context of insider threat detection. The insider threat detection framework proposed here combines
attributed graph clustering techniques and outlier ranking in subspaces of attributed graphs. To the best of our
knowledge, though the graph based approaches are adopted in malicious insider threat detection frameworks,
anomaly detection in attributed graphs using subspace and subgraph clustering has not been widely applied in
insider threat detection frameworks. Thus this is one of the early attempts at using subspace/subgraph clustering
coupled with outlier ranking for anomaly detection in the insider threat research domain. We have utilized two main
13
TABLE IV
THE AREA UNDER CURVE (AUC) VALUES FOR DIFFERENT SCORING FUNCTIONS WITH EDCAR CLUSTERING ALGORITHM
Case nmin smin score.1 score.2 score.3 score.4 score.5 score.6
A 3 2 0.7313 0.7287 0.7478 0.7017 0.7090 0.6927
B 4 2 0.6687 0.6690 0.6669 0.6576 0.6572 0.6503
C 5 2 0.6017 0.6014 0.6009 0.5976 0.5974 0.5952
D 3 3 0.6931 0.6923 0.6958 0.6634 0.6656 0.6430
E 4 3 0.6794 0.6800 0.6781 0.6707 0.6704 0.6641
F 5 3 0.6040 0.6045 0.6032 0.5963 0.5968 0.5929
G 3 4 0.7114 0.7109 0.7100 0.6795 0.6801 0.6623
H 4 4 0.6453 0.6453 0.6442 0.6335 0.6341 0.6269
I 5 4 0.5732 0.5742 0.5708 0.5705 0.5695 0.5698
J 3 5 0.6996 0.6994 0.7004 0.6717 0.6728 0.6516
K 4 5 0.5917 0.5923 0.5918 0.5825 0.5826 0.5816
L 5 5 0.5479 0.5474 0.5473 0.5374 0.5391 0.5337
M 3 6 0.6988 0.6967 0.7021 0.6618 0.6669 0.6371
N 3 7 0.7035 0.7025 0.7034 0.6786 0.6789 0.6648
O 3 8 0.7648 0.7649 0.7638 0.7329 0.7349 0.7114
P 3 9 0.7160 0.7153 0.7139 0.6808 0.6814 0.6621
Q 3 10 0.6743 0.6731 0.6775 0.6443 0.6476 0.6220
subspace/subgraph clustering algorithms namely “EDCAR” and “GAMER” for community detection in attributed
graphs. Also, we have adopted the outlier ranking mechanism “GOutRank”, which is the first approach for outlier
ranking in subspaces of attributed graphs. In addition to the proposed vertex scoring mechanisms in “GOutRank”
algorithm, we also identified betweenness centrality measure as another useful centrality score. Based on the
experimental results we obtained the best AUC value of ROC curves for “EDCAR” clustering algorithm with
outlier ranking score defined based on the node degree.
In subsequent work, we will look at more graph based properties such as other centrality measures as well as
subgraph properties to incorporate in outlier ranking scoring mechanism. Also we focus our attention on dynamic
attributed graph clustering, which can be useful in integrating the time dimensionality of the problem. Integration
of scenario based attribute subspaces would also be another path we would like to focus in the future. Also our
continuous work focuses on a comprehensive parameter list related to insider threat problem and related attribute
extraction techniques in addition to our previous work [10] [11]. This would include content analysis techniques
which will be useful in identifying web access behavior as well as email communications. On the other side we
would also look at attribute extraction methodologies from social and professional networks, which can be used as
an evidence for the hidden behavior of a user.
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